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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the prospect of a PRC naval role in the Persian Gulf by 2025 
and its implications for the United States Navy, focusing in particular on Beijing’s 
evolving relationship with Iran.  Since the last years of the Cold War, China’s 
relationships with the United States and Russia have improved significantly, and China 
no longer sees these former adversaries as imminent threats.  As a result, the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has shifted its strategy from a defensive posture to a forward-
looking one.  Concurrently, economic developments and progress have raised China’s 
aspirations to become the new regional power in Asia.  As such, the PRC’s economic 
sustainability will depend greatly on imported oil.  The Persian Gulf will be a strategic 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 23rd [2002], two Chinese Navy ships, the guided missile 
destroyer Qingdao and a support vessel were greeted by a cheering crowd. 
… The small flotilla visited eight countries on five continents. The route 
of its 132-day voyage included the Arabian Sea…1  
--AME Info, Jan 16, 2003 
A. THESIS QUESTION - STRATEGIC “INSECURITY” 
The United States Navy has been providing security and stability -- freedom of 
navigation, combating piracy, and answering distress calls -- in the Persian Gulf for 
decades, so why would China want to take on the same role, possibly draining its own 
resources?  A simple answer is that China sees the U.S. as a threat in the event of 
conflict, especially over Taiwan.  
The United States has traditionally incorporated use of naval power, such as 
blockades, during a war.  There are countless examples dating from the American 
Revolution to today’s war on terrorism in which the United States Navy denied its 
opponent resources via the open seas.  In peacetime, the U.S. has used its naval power to 
enforce restrictions, as it did with Iraqi oil sales in the 1990s after invading Kuwait.  
Restricting important resources such as oil may eventually lead to war, however.  For 
instance, many historians believe Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II 
was a result of the U.S. boycott on sales of oil and scrap metals to Japan.  China may 
simply want to protect its national and economic interests by avoiding such pitfalls. 
This thesis will argue that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will not attain 
sufficient naval modernization in the next 20 years to pose a major threat for the US 
Navy.  Furthermore, although China wants to limit the United States’ “hegemony” in the 
Middle East, it desires stability and security in the Persian Gulf, via the U.S. Navy, which 
is critical to its economic stability.  This thesis analyzes the possibility of Chinese naval 
influence in the Persian Gulf by 2025 (due to China’s increasing appetite for oil) and the 
resulting implications for the United States Navy. 
 
1 “China Turns to the Gulf.” AME Info FN, January 16, 2003. From 
Hwww.ameinfo.com/16699.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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1. Don’t Want to be Poor Again 
Sustained growth in the PRC’s economy will depend on China’s ability to 
transport resources and conduct trade using the open sea; therefore, protection of sea 
lanes of communications (SLOC) will be vitally important.  Chinese economic success 
during the last two decades has created an increasing demand for raw materials and oil.  
The export of manufacturing goods rose by about 15 percent annually from the 1990s to 
2000, to $220 billion dollars.2  
One of the main reasons why China’s economy boomed was the abundance of 
cheap labor for manufacturing and the economic reforms undertaken by Deng Xiaoping 
and his successors.  The demand for oil and natural gas to feed a strong economy is 
unlikely to slow down anytime soon.    The industrial revolution in the West created 
demand for materials such as rubber, steel, and oil in the late 19th century.  The same type 
of demand can be expected as more than a billion Chinese will desire automobiles, 
modern housing, and manufactured goods like the West.   
2. Oil 
The Persian Gulf has vast amounts of proven oil reserves, and it is a region 
critical to the world’s energy supply for everything from factories to automobiles. The 
U.S. Department of Energy published these facts about the Persian Gulf:   
In 2003, the Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) produced about 27% of the 
world's oil, while holding 57% (715 billion barrels) of the world's crude 
oil reserves. OECD gross oil imports from Persian Gulf countries 
averaged about 11.6 million barrels per day (bbl/d) during 2003, 
accounting for 46% of the OECD's total net oil imports. Besides oil, the 
Persian Gulf region also has huge reserves (2,462 trillion cubic feet -- Tcf) 
of natural gas, accounting for 45% of total proven world gas reserves.3  
The Straits of Hormuz is the only entrance and exit for ships to and from the 
Persian Gulf.  The U.S. Department of Energy estimates 90 percent of oil exports from 
the Gulf transits thorough the Straits of Hormuz (consisting of 2-mile-wide channels for 
 
2 “Will China Take Over World Manufacturing?” The International Economy, Winter 2003. p. 72. 
3 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief, Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Fact Sheet,” 
September 2004. From Hwww.eia.doe.govH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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traffic and a 2-mile-wide buffer zone), located between Oman and Iran. 4  This main 
artery for oil accounts for two-fifths of all world-traded oil.5 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The Persian Gulf borders several countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain. 6  The biggest oil exporters 
are Saudi Arabia, followed by Iran (see Figure 1).7  Six out of seven countries have 
diplomatic ties with the United States, and many host U.S. military bases.  Also Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman are members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which promotes free trade and regional defense.    
With the exception of Iran, all these countries have significant economic ties with 
the United States.  For example, according to the U.S. State Department, the United 
States is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia is the U.S.’s largest 
export market in the Middle East.8  For this reason, this thesis will assume that normal 
relations will continue between these countries, leaving Iran as the country that can grant 
China access to a foothold in the Persian Gulf.   
This thesis limits its scope only to Iranian-Chinese relations.  Normalization of 
relationships between Iran and the United States seem bleak for several reasons.  
According to the State Department, there are at least four objectionable behaviors that are 
keeping the countries on chilly footing.  The problem areas are:9  
• Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction;  
• Its support for and involvement in international terrorism;  
• Its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; and  
• Its dismal human rights record.  
 
4 See Appendix I, “Map of Persian Gulf.” From  
Hwww.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/arab_pennisula.gifH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
5 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief, Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Fact Sheet,” 
September 2004. From Hwww.eia.doe.govH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
6 Appendix I, “Map of Persian Gulf.” From  
Hwww.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/arab_pennisula.gifH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
7 See Figure 1 Persian Gulf Exports by Country—2003. 
8 U.S. Department of State. From Hhttp://www.state.gov/countries/H [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
9 U.S. Department of State. From Hhttp://www.state.gov/countries/H [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
Drastic political changes can conceivably happen in a few short years.  There 
have been many regime changes and changes of allegiance in the last twenty years.  But 
relations with some countries have not changed much for decades -- consider North 
Korea and Cuba. If the current Iranian regime holds onto power, we can assume the 
country will be used as a beachhead by the PRC and its navy to enter the Persian Gulf.  
China and Iran currently have a strong political relationship and they will likely continue 









Figure 1.   Persian Gulf Exports by Country - 2003 
 
C. RELEVANCE OF TOPIC 
The global war on terrorism, record-high oil prices, Iranian nuclear proliferation, 
and China’s economy are some of the major headlines the world media are covering 
today.  These topics will be important for the U.S. military and its strategic 
considerations in the Middle East and the Pacific.  The U.S. Defense Department and 
Congress have been trying to reshape the military since the end of the Cold War and the 
exit of the Soviet Union as the No. 1 potential enemy.  Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) are some tools being used to reshape 
the U.S. military.  This thesis offers a glimpse of what the United States Navy may be 
facing in the next twenty years.    
D. METHODOLOGY 
The basic methodology used in this thesis assesses the historical relevance of 
outcomes reached by countries faced with similar circumstances in modern history.  
5 
Economic factors, military trends, and international politics are used extensively to build 
evidence to a reach conclusion.  Sources used for this thesis are mainly literature, 
academic writings, periodicals, government publications, and the Internet.  In addition, 
the author’s academic knowledge gained from Naval Postgraduate School and 
operational experience gained as a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) in the Pacific and the 
Persian Gulf is applied to this thesis.  
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I addresses the question why the PRC may want to develop a navy 
capable of operating in the Persian Gulf.  It underlines SLOCs as a vital necessity for 
China’s economy and contends that Iran is the most logical country China will use to 
gain a toehold in the region. 
Chapter II examines the building of a modern navy using the Imperial Japanese 
Navy in the late 19th century as a model.  This chapter shows that a transformation of 
continental power to naval power can be achieved with favorable economic 
circumstances and political desire.  Problems that faced the Imperial Japanese Navy, such 
as technology, integration of tactics and doctrine, and early naval engagement, are 
discussed that led the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the similar path. 
Chapter III describes the People’s Liberation Army from past to present.  This 
chapter explores how China’s current military culture and doctrine were developed based 
on its history.  It addresses why its military culture considerations and international 
politics may hinder rapid naval modernization. 
Chapter IV considers China’s naval strategy in light of its current capabilities.  
The chapter explains why Taiwan and the South China Sea will be China’s primary 
focus, while more distant places such as the Persian Gulf will take a back seat for some 
time. 
Chapter V concentrates on political and military cooperation between Iran and 
China.  It contends that Iran and China will continue their friendly relations in the future 
to contain U.S. hegemonic influence in the Persian Gulf.  The Sino-Iranian relationship 
has mutual benefits with economic and strategic implications; however, the warming 
relations may lead to negative international consequences.  
6 
Chapter VI summarizes prospects for China’s naval modernization and Chinese 
potential as a contender against the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf by 2025.  
Although this thesis argues that the PRC will not have capabilities or strong reason to 
oppose the U.S. Navy, dialogue and communications must be clear so as not to threaten 




                                                
II. NAVY BUILDING 101 
Japan succeeded in rapidly modernizing its navy from the keel up.  Japan’s 
readiness to undertake such an expensive10 venture may be attributed to its desire to 
enhance its economy, military power, and international prestige.  Traditional land 
powers11 such as Germany and Russia also desired the same benefits, which prompted 
them to build capable navies of their own.12  Each country produced differing degrees of 
success.   The common denominator, however, was that each possessed the economic 
capability to accomplish such a feat. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing 
industrialization and economic prosperity may take it down a similar road of naval 
modernization.  This chapter explores the possibility of whether a non-maritime country 
can successfully transform itself into a great naval power in a matter of decades.  Japan’s 
naval modernization from the Meiji period though World War II will be used to assess 
whether an emerging power like China can achieve rapid modernization and become a 
formidable naval power. 
A. SETTING THE STAGE  
World War II ended in Europe with the fall of Berlin, and it was only a matter of 
time for the remaining Axis power, Japan, to meet the same fate.  This end came hastily 
with the atomic explosions on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki three days 
later.  Japan, which had no remaining allies and was no match for the “super weapon,” 
had little choice but to surrender.  The declaration of surrender was signed and formally 
accepted by General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on September 
2, 1945 on board the battleship USS Missouri. This setting was a fitting but ironic end to 
what Japan had envisioned as a glorious conglomeration of empire stretching throughout 
Asia. 
 
10 Maintaining a navy requires tremendous capital and manpower. Infrastructure like docks and 
shipyards require skilled workers to keep ships afloat.  Logistics considerations such as food, water, and 
fuels are costly due to extensive preparation.  Seamanship and navigation require extensive training time 
and education.   
11 Referring to countries with little or no past maritime strategy in the past to secure or protect its 
national interest through a navy. 
12 See Appendix A  “Maritime Strategy,” Moran, D.J., Naval Post Graduate School, PDF file, Class 
Notes, “Naval History and Maritime Strategy,” p. 2. 
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Japan used its naval forces to implement a national strategy of expanding its 
interests through sea power.  It also attempted to cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet while 
buying time to consolidate its power before negotiating a truce with the United States.  
Despite the delayed advancements in the Japanese navy and its eventual defeat, Japan’s 
naval arm played an important role in formulating and successfully contributing to its 
national strategy through modernization.  Japan had little choice but to develop naval 
power to continually expand its imperial domain, but consequently it paid a great price in 
doing so. 
B. WHY A NAVY?  
Great Britain and Japan have little in common in their cultures and histories, 
except their geographical settings.  Their island status played an important role in 
formulating their national strategies toward naval strength to achieve their national 
objectives.  Ships were essential for importing and exporting goods for trade and 
consumption, which in turn created reasons for developing powerful navies.   
Two viable reasons why Japan needed to build a navy were, first, to protect its 
commerce and foreign trade in the sea lanes, and second, to wage war to gain power and 
colonies.  Imperial states conquered and colonized other countries to control resources 
and profit from subsequent trade.  Domination of the sea meant not only protecting 
commercial ships and trade, but also enhancing power to engage in economic warfare 
against enemies.  Naval historian Nicolas Tracy said, “…[A]ttack on oceanic trade was a 
means of economic war, which was technically possible, whereas attack on the economic 
resources within a state was impossible unless the territory in which they lay had already 
been captured.”13  Japan and Great Britain, therefore, had similar reasons for building 
their naval power, but monumental differences existed in time and in their capabilities 
during the industrial era. 
Britain had been a great sea power for centuries before Japan’s economic success 
and industrialization.  Japan desired Britain’s imperialist and naval power, but the 
country lacked the  technology, experience, logistical support, and knowledge to replicate  
 
13 Tracy, Nicolas, “Before World War I,” Attack on Maritime Trade (1991) p. 82. 
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the British model.  Nevertheless, with hard work, Japan managed to emulate, with great 
success, Britain’s naval power in a short few years.  Economic wealth was the one key 
ingredient Japan feverishly acquired during this period. 
C. MODERN IMPERIAL NAVY 
The industrial revolution and access to resources created the financial prosperity 
needed to build a large navy.   This effort took enormous technical knowledge and 
required seasoned sailors to operate the ships and their facilities.  Regardless of the costs 
and complexities, Japan understood the benefits of having a capable navy like Britain’s 
during this age of colonialism.  For example, transportation of goods through sea routes 
was far more cost-effective than by land.  Also, overseas colonies were vital to a nation’s 
prosperity.14  Resources and profits from overseas trade kept economies healthy. 
Consequently, the expansion of Japan’s economy and naval modernization did not go 
unnoticed by its neighbors. 
Industrialization rocketed Japan to the status of an emerging economic and 
military power by the late 1890s, and it was regarded as the foremost regional power by 
most European counterparts and neighboring states.  The Japanese Shogunate was unified 
by the Tokugawa after centuries of division under warlords and shoguns. Under the 
Meiji, the Japanese economy and military were modernized and reformed according to 
Western models.  Its effectiveness put Japan on an equal footing with Europe, both 
financially and militarily.  However, the wealth acquired by the Japanese was probably 
not what initiated their strategic effort toward obtaining sea power.  
The catalyst of Japanese Westernization and naval interests should be credited to 
Western naval and military influences on China.  The European commercial and colonial 
presence in Asia was rapidly approaching its shores, and Japan was primarily concerned 
with this threat of European encroachment.  Japan sought useful technology and 
economic systems from the Europeans to beat them at their own game.  This European 
threat induced the Meiji to form its national strategy toward creating a capable navy 
rather than building its land force.   The maritime defeat of Satsuma and Choshu by  
 
14 Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, New York, 1983) pp. 
187-188. 
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Western warships, along with Commodore Perry’s uncontested naval fleet, created 
Japan’s urgency to modernize its navy. 15  The Meiji government saw naval strength as 
paramount to the defense of the nation.   
Early attempts at naval modernization were difficult and expensive due to the lack 
of a foundation for a strong naval force.  The Japanese fleet was a collection of old and 
outdated ships purchased from Western nations.  It lacked continuity among its various 
weapons and armaments, and its limited propulsion capabilities were suited only for 
coastal defense.16  Prior to the Meiji, waterborne vessels were only used to support the 
army.  The transition was slow and foreign assistance negligible, but the Japanese 
demonstrated their determination to create a naval force capable of defending the country 
from foreign naval invasion.  Recruitment and training were aggressively pursued with 
the European navies as models. 
D. SEA TRIALS AND CONFIDENCE BUILDER 
Japanese experience in naval operations was virtually non-existent prior to the 
Meiji period.  During the previous nine centuries, only two attempts had been made to 
invade foreign countries, both ending in disaster.17  The “terra-phile” Japanese army was 
reluctant to give equal footing to or share resources with the navy.  In the past, ships had 
been used only as a means of transporting land troops.  The army viewed the navy as a 
supporting unit, but not as a battle force.  Naval organization was ultimately ironed out 
by the 1890s, and when all of the military was placed under the banner of the Emperor, 
the Japanese navy was given a higher status than before, but it was still subordinate to the 
army.18  However, the growing influence and reorganization of the navy soon made it 
ready for action.  The two attempted naval failures of the past centuries were about to be 
reversed against its old rivals, China and Korea.   
Japan perceived China as an obstacle and a rival to its desire for regional power.  
The modernization of the Japanese naval forces greatly enhanced the Meiji government’s 
ambition to control its sea lanes and expand its territory.  Prospects for empire building  
15 Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, New York, 1983) p. 7.  
16 Ibid p. 8 
17 Evans, David C., and Peattie, Mark R., “First Success,” Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology 
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 2. 
18 Ibid., pp. 1-51. 
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were limited to the Asian continent due to the delayed colonization in comparison with 
the European powers.  These perceptions greatly influenced the future strategic 
perspective of Japanese naval thought.19 
Japan’s growing interest in increasing its regional power and China’s 
determination to stop this expansion in Korea, its tributary kingdom, caused major 
friction.  China also built up its naval forces after humiliating defeats from France. 20  
Korea proved to be a flashpoint for both China and Japan.  China strived to maintain 
regional power and sustain status quo over Asia, while Japan aimed to take control over 
former Chinese interests.    
E. FINDING THE PHILOSOPHY AND WEAPONS MIXTURE 
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 provided Japan its first operational 
experience in naval warfare.  The Chinese navy appeared initially to have the advantage 
because its ships were more numerous. China possessed two German battleships that 
Japan could not have countered.  However, Japanese weapon designs were different in 
philosophy in that they opted for a faster rate of gunfire rather than a larger caliber or 
punch power.  Quick-firing guns that could be loaded and fired at a much faster speed 
than the large Chinese guns may have been a decisive edge for the Japanese fleet.  Ships 
with quick-firing guns were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese ships.   
Japanese tactics were also better than those of the Chinese.  The “Flying 
Squadron,” comprised of fast ships, led the pack and attacked the weakest flank, while 
the slower ships finished off the remaining enemy in the rear.  Japanese communications 
were subsequently better under their unified command, while the Chinese Peiyang Fleet 
consisted of four separate regional forces.  Ultimately, Chinese retreating ships were 
trapped in port and captured by advancing Japanese land forces.21    
The victory over China was crucial to Japan’s future naval advancement because 
it symbolized a moral victory against a formidable foe by a smaller but more disciplined 
naval  force.   This  victory  underlined  the importance of  tactics,  communications,  and  
 
19 Evans, David C., and Peattie, Mark R., “First Success,” Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology 
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 5. 
20 Ibid., p. 19. 
21 Ibid., pp. 32-51. 
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speed, along with a balance of armaments and guns.  The subsequent advancement of the 
Japanese navy incorporated the lessons learned from this victory over the Chinese fleet 
and applied it against a powerful European foe. 
F. THE NEW CONTENDER  
Japan’s progress was rapidly achieving parity with the Western maritime powers 
by the beginning of the 20th century.  Japan, fresh from victory over China and in pursuit 
of its empire, took an interest in the borders of Korea and Manchuria.  Korea and 
Manchuria were preyed on for their geographical proximity to home and their historical 
subordination to China.  Victory initially appeared an easy task, since neither country 
possessed a formidable military.  However, the Russian presence and interest in the 
region made things much more difficult for Japan. 
The Russo-Japanese War was a contest for the control of colonies.  Japan needed 
to control the seas to support its army in Korea.  To neutralize the Russian navy, Japan 
deployed its Combined Fleet under Admiral Togo Heihachiro, an experienced naval 
commander who was educated in Great Britain.  He led the fight against the Russians and 
proved Japan’s mettle as an emerging naval power.22  Japan, although inferior in numbers 
of troops and ships, successfully defeated the Russians in a series of battles.   
Among the naval and land battles worth highlighting is the Battle of Tsushima.  
The Russian Baltic Fleet that sailed from Europe to Japan was forced to choose a second 
option after the initial objective of relieving Port Arthur, which was no longer viable 
since the Japanese land forces had already occupied it.  The Baltic Fleet proceeded to 
Vladivostok thorough Tsushima, which is located between Korea and Japan, where they 
were consequently discovered and defeated by Admiral Togo.  This was one of the most 
decisive naval battles, costing the Russians 34 of their 38 ships, which were sunk or 
destroyed.23  Russia soon sought peace due to its lack of military success and its growing 
concern over civil war.  The Russian defeat elevated Japan to a new sense of pride and 
confidence in its ability to compete with  European adversaries.  Great Britain  renewed a 
 
22 Evans, David C., and Peattie, Mark R., “First Success,” Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology 
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1997) p. 82. 
23 Ibid., p. 124. 
13 
                                                
Japanese alliance during World War I and recognized Japan’s sphere of influence in Asia 
over Korea and Manchuria.  Japan continued its regional dominance until end of World 
War II. 
G. GETTING READY FOR A BIG FIGHT 
Japan’s success in colonization, with the help of its navy, demonstrated the 
importance of sea power as a strategic national interest.  The remaining territory and 
region fit for colonization by Japan lay in the Pacific.  Japan’s formal ally in World War 
I, the United States, also maintained a keen interest in the Pacific region.  The interests of 
Japan and the United States overlapped mainly in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam, and 
so charted a course of eventual collision.  Japan’s alliance with Germany and Italy during 
World War II and its attack on Pearl Harbor ultimately pulled the United States into the 
conflict.  
The technological innovations behind Japan’s navy also propelled its industrial 
forces toward World War II.  Shipbuilding and aerospace industries, run by Mitsubishi 
and other conglomerates, manufactured and designed aircraft such as the “Mitsubishi 
Zero-A6M.”  Japanese ships and aircraft carriers rapidly improved.  Japan was one of the 
few countries in the world that possessed engineering capabilities for such weapons.  On 
this footing, Japan challenged the United States and its unrivaled materials and 
manpower to engage in a war.  Nevertheless, Admiral Yamamoto Isokuro, commander-
in-chief of the Combined Fleet protested, “…[o]ut of the question! To fight the United 
States is like fighting the whole world.” 24  After almost four years of fighting, the war 
ended in 1945. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Overall, Japan’s creation of a global naval power was a success.  The military 
projected its power throughout Korea and China to become a dominant Asian force with 
its victories over China and Russia, a Eurasian nation.  Its wealth, acquired through the 
Meiji restoration period, satisfied the initial condition to build a costly navy, which in 
turn, embedded the navy into national strategy.  Subsequently, Japan dominated regions 
that were rich in resources.  
 
24 Marzolda and Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat, 108,111,162-163, quoted in George 
W. Baer, “The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990,” One Hundred Years of Sea Power, (Connecticut: Stanford 
University Press, 1993) p. 169. 
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The industrialization of Japan’s economy would not have succeeded without the 
modernization of its navy.  Even after losing World War II, the Japanese economy kept 
par with European powers and is currently the second largest economy in the world.  The 
high cost and growing pains of creating a strong navy were an invaluable investment for 
achieving Japan’s national interest.  The PRC currently has enjoyed economic 
advancement similar to that of Japan, which allowed it to modernize its naval forces in 
the late 1800s.  The PRC will likely create and maintain a navy that will enhance its 
strategic interest as the Japanese did.  The People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) will 
most likely face similar challenges as the early Japanese imperial navy did in 
incorporating modern technology to build its naval force and finding the right mix of 
doctrine and weapons.  The PLAN’s experience and confidence-boosting victories will 













                                                
III. FLEDGLING TO ADOLESCENCE 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a major transformation in 
strategy and modernization since its inception in 1927 by the Communist Party in China.  
The communist strategy mainly evolved around its perception of threat and increased 
economic progress.  Since 1949, the PLA’s main purpose has been to secure and protect 
the ruling communist regime from largely land-based threats.  The military’s culture and 
traditions may hinder its strategic thinking. Development of a modern, professional force 
capable of operating beyond China’s borders may take much more time than the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) leadership wants or anticipates.   
This chapter will discuss PLA strategy and modernization from its early years to 
the present.  Analysis suggests that even though the People’s Liberation Army has 
modernized many aspects of its military forces, it is at least a few decades away from 
contending with the United States Navy in a “blue water” environment like the Persian 
Gulf. 25    
A. PLA BACKGROUND  
Traditionally the PLA’s ground forces have been the centerpiece of its military 
might, with the Air Force and Navy playing supporting roles.  The strength of the PLA 
has always been its size.26  Even the name, “People’s Liberation Army,” points out its 
obvious strength.  The sheer number of troops is truly amazing, with over 2.31 million 
soldiers in the military, in addition to 500,000-600,000 in reserve units as of 2001.  Aside 
from regular army units, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) supplements the PLA in the 
 
25 According to Wikipedia, the definition of “color” in water represents distance from land.   
The brown water environment consists of the HlittoralH areas, from the coast and HestuarialH areas 
to perhaps a hundred miles from shore. It is the most important maritime arena, including all coastal traffic 
and territorial waters, in which are found the great majority of a nation’s HmaritimeH HpoliceH, customs, 
environmental, and economic concerns. 
The green water environment extends from of the outer edge of the brown water zone past any 
Hcontinental shelvesH, HarchipelagosH and HislandsH; perhaps a thousand miles from shore. 
The blue water environment extends from of the outer edge of the green water zone through the global 
deep HoceanH. 
From Hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_waterH [Last accessed June 16, 2005] 
26 Bernstein, Richard and Munro, Ross H., The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1997) p. 67. PRC’s military strength was close to 4 million in the mid-1980s.  Efforts were 
made to reduce the number of troops in the 1990s. 
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paramilitary role, with 1.5 million officers.  The PRC commands the biggest military in 
the world today, with Russia and United States placing a distant second and third with 1.5 
million and 1.3 million troops, respectively, in 2000.27   
B. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 
The Soviet Union played a large role in developing and modernizing the PLA.    
The Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed in 1950 and created a formal alliance between the 
PRC and the Soviet Union.  Under its terms, China gave the Soviet Union certain rights, 
such as the use of a naval base, in exchange for military support, weapons, and economic 
and technological assistance, including technical advisers and machinery.  For example, 
during the 1950s, the PLA’s air force was able to modernize by acquiring massive 
numbers of Soviet MiGs and air-defense weapons.  Soviet military assistance helped to 
build PLA military doctrine and technology.  In the late 1950s, major differences 
emerged that led to Moscow terminating military assistance to China, which could have 
erupted in a war in 1969.  In the early 1990s, however, after the collapse of the USSR, 
Russia resumed its former role as a supplier of weapons and military technology to 
China.  Even today, Russia is the PRC’s primary foreign weapons supplier.28 
C. PHASE ONE 
The strategy of using manpower as the greatest resource the Chinese had against a 
superior enemy (in terms of technology, weapons, logistics) — the concept of a “People’s 
War” — was introduced from 1937-1945 against the Japanese during World War II.  It 
was formally reintroduced by Mao Zedong from 1960 to 1978.   The basic theory was to 
lure the enemy into China and take advantage of geography, using numerically superior 
numbers of troops, to defeat a technologically superior force.29   The PRC hoped that the 
poorly equipped and trained PLA could effectively stave off its aggressor using its 
people, hence the term and strategy. 
The expansive landmass of China was used to construct defensive and economic 
zones in the country’s hinterlands.  The PRC’s creation of economic zones in remote and 
 
27 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001/2002 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
28 “European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implication and Options for U.S. Policy,” CRS 
Report for Congress, April 15, 2005. p. 14. 
29 Shambaugh, David, Modernizing China’s Military (University of California Press, 2004) p. 58. 
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desolate parts of the country was purely a defensive strategy.  In the 1950s and ’60s, the 
PRC challenge was to defend its territory mainly against threats from the U.S., via 
Taiwan and/or Korea.  The Soviets were also perceived as a threat during the 1960s and 
1970s.  The strategy of the PLA was to use the land as a buffer zone to wear out the 
enemy. Meanwhile, the factories in the interior produced weapons and sustained the 
economy so that the people’s war could slow and grind the enemy to a halt.   
D. PHASE TWO 
Late in 1978 to 1985, the focus changed from a “people’s war” to “people’s war 
under modern conditions”.30  By the 1970s, many countries, including the United States, 
recognized the PRC as the legitimate government in China instead of the Republic of 
China (ROC) or Taiwan.  The international recognition of the People’s Republic of China 
brought normalization to economic relations between the United States and the rest of the 
world.  The warming relations with the West gave the PRC an opportunity to modernize 
its forces.  Its overall strategy shifted from “luring the enemy in deep” to stopping the 
enemy at the border.  
E. PHASE THREE   
The PRC’s prestige and confidence was growing by the mid-1980s, and China no 
longer assessed invasion from Soviet Union and United States as a high probability.    
The PLA shifted its grand strategy to “local, limited wars.”31  The limited scope of wars 
to prepare for was vastly different from the PLA’s previous strategy and contributed to 
initial reduction in troop numbers in 1985. 
 The Chinese army, with more than 4 million men and a small but capable nuclear 
weapons arsenal, made China a hard target for any country to challenge.  In 1971, PRC 
became an influential voice as a permanent voting member of the United Nations.   In 
addition, the formal recognition of PRC in 1979 by Washington gave Beijing status as the 
legitimate sovereign government of China.  
F. PHASE FOUR 
The strategy changed once again after the United States routed Iraq, the fourth 
largest army in the world at the time.  The events of the Gulf War in 1991 were an eye 
 
30 Shambaugh, David, Modernizing China’s Military (University of California Press, 2004) pp. 62-66. 
31 Ibid., p. 64. 
18 
                                                
opener for the PRC, and it forced the country’s strategy to shift from “local, limited 
wars” to “local, limited war under high-tech conditions,” which is the current focus of 
PLA development.  The massive aerial attack during Desert Storm and “100-hour ground 
war” solidified Beijing’s conclusion that the number of soldiers does not equate with 
victory or security.  
Operation Desert Storm was carefully studied by the PLA because of Iraq’s use of 
Chinese weaponry.  Laser-guided weapons and advanced command, control, computer, 
and integration using high-tech surveillance equipment took apart the fourth largest army 
in the world in a matter of days.  The ineffectiveness of Iraq’s military was even more 
stunning to PLA brass due to the systematic destruction of Chinese-made tanks, trucks, 
and planes, and the complete neutralization of the Iraqi air force and communications 
system.  PLA leaders may have envisioned that the same situation could happen to China 
in the event of war against Taiwan involving the United States.  Changes had to be 
implemented to avoid the likelihood of a similar demise.     
G. PLAN MODERNIZATION 
Trends in world politics along with economic growth in China have changed 
Beijing’s view of its security needs, leading it to look further outside its borders instead 
of simply defending its territory.  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the shift 
in threat assessment toward Taiwan created a drastic change in strategy.  This shift of 
focus meant giving priority to the PLA’s navy (PLAN) and air force (PLAAF), instead of 
ground forces.  According to the U.S. Secretary of Defense in his FY99 Report to 
Congress:  
Beijing's military modernization program, underway for the past two 
decades, is designed to prepare the PLA to conduct regional active 
defensive warfare in support of Chinese economic interests and 
sovereignty claims.32 
1. Weapons in Hand but Not Ready for Use?  
The PRC’s modernization since the Gulf War has been extensive.  However, the 
training and the technology are still many years behind.  Some analysts have argued that 
 
32 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 26, 1999. From 
Hhttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait_02261999.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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the PRC has assigned its navy a prime role ahead of its army and air force.33  The most 
striking development is the commissioning of several 10,000-ton class all-round supply 
ships.34  This is a pivotal change in Chinese naval history because a supply ship of this 
size is indication of an intention to build a navy that can extend far beyond its coastal 
waters.   
It must be noted that possessing the right equipment alone does not guarantee that 
a navy can carry out complex operations during a crisis.  It takes years of knowledge and 
persistent training for the officers and crew to skillfully and safely conduct an underway 
replenishment (taking on fuels, food, equipment, personnel, etc., from ship to ship while 
at sea).  In addition, coordination of ships must be well orchestrated, and relatively safe 
places to conduct such operations must be found.  This type of operation requires 
efficiency in training and communications, as well as sea superiority. PLAN has certainly 
made improvements in these areas, but it seems it is not yet able to synchronize all 
necessary levels.  Even if PLAN effectively masters the training and communications 
aspects in a few short years, it is many years from achieving naval superiority against the 
United States Navy in “blue water.”   
2. Domestic Production and Improvements 
The People’s Republic of China’s commercial shipbuilding has improved 
significantly.35  Although China still lags behind Korea and Japan in shipbuilding, it has 
caught up in main commercial ship manufacturing.  The PRC’s ability to produce large, 
sophisticated  ships has  improved  dramatically in  the past  20 years.  The  Chinese have  
been developing Luhu class destroyers and Jianwei class frigates since the 1980s.  The 
type 052C Lanzhou class destroyers are being developed with phased-array radar similar 
to U.S. Arleigh Burke class destroyers.36 
 
 
33 Aharari, M.E., “Strategic Implications of China’s Naval Modernization,” Armed Forces Staff 
College, October 1998. p. 1. 
34 “Will China Take Over World Manufacturing,” The International Economy, Winter 2003. p. 72. 
35 See Appendix B, “European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. 
Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 2005. p. 14. 
36 Chinese Defense Today. From Hhttp://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/052c.aspH [Last 
accessed May 16, 2005] 
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3. Foreign Technology and Acquisitions  
The greatest threat to the United States Navy will undoubtedly come from the 
PRC’s development of undersea assets and its recently acquired Russian weaponry — 
especially Sovremenny class destroyers. 37  In 1996, an $800 million deal was reached 
between PRC and Russia, and by April 1999, two Sovremenny class destroyers were 
delivered.38  These destroyers are capable of launching SS-N-22 Sunburn Missiles, which 
can kill an aircraft carrier in a single stroke.  They are widely believed to have been 
acquired as a deterrent to stop the U.S. 7th Fleet from intervening in a Taiwan Strait crisis.   
4. Naval Components 
A glimpse of PLAN’s overall strategy may be had by looking into what type of 
weapons it is acquiring.  Overall, the number of surface ships has gone up, but the 
number of vessels that can be used to project power beyond “green water,” like nuclear-
powered submarines, aircraft carriers, logistics ships, and amphibious ships, is still not 
significant enough to consider PLAN as having a “blue water” ambition.   
a. Submarine Force 
PLAN has a relatively large quantity of patrol submarines and a few attack 
submarines that can create havoc against its enemies.  Most of the PLAN submarines are 
old and technologically inferior to U.S. subs, but they are very difficult to locate 
(regardless of sophistication).  Patrol subs, such as Ming and Romeo class boats, have an 
estimated strength of about 70.  Submarines of any type or number can seriously affect a 
naval battle, regardless of technology, because they are difficult to detect.  Most of the 
PLAN  submarines are  diesel-electric powered, which  are relatively quieter and cheaper, 
but they are limited to coastal waters.  A few nuclear-propulsion submarines, which have 
a much greater range compared with diesel electric, are coming into service soon, but 
PLAN has not shown great emphasis on obtaining such equipment.39 
b. Surface Navy 
Acquisition of certain hardware may be a telltale sign of the PLA’s overall 
modernization intentions.  On March 3, 2005, PLAN purchased a 130-ton Russian Zubr  
37 See Appendix B., “European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. 
Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 2005. p. 14. 
38 “Sovremenny Class (Project 956/EM) Missile Destroyer,” China Defense Today. From 
Hhttp://www.sinodefense.com/navy/surface/sov.aspH [Last accessed June 16, 2005] 
39 See Figure 2. 
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class LCAC40 (Landing Craft Air Cushion).41  The Zubr class LCAC has a capacity to 
reach Taiwan from mainland China at speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour. After many 
years of a stagnated amphibious force, this occurrence may indicate a new trend.42  The 
LCAC’s advantage is speed, but its disadvantage is the distance it can travel.43  The U.S. 
Navy and other fleets use LCACs for power projection by using amphibious ships like 
Dock Landing Ship (LSD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and Amphibious Attack 
Ship (LHA) to transport a limited number (two or three) of LCACs in their well decks, 
which can then be launched near the objective.  Additionally, PLAN amphibious 
capabilities are very limited.  According to a report in January 2000, the inventory of 
amphibious ships included only 49 ships with 1000 tons of displacement, with some that 
were built during the World War II era.44   If PLAN mainly concentrates on purchase of 
LCACs and ignores amphibious ships that can carry LCACs, it may suggest that PLAN is 
intending to use the LCACs close to China’s shores.  
c. Aircraft Carriers 
Acquisition of the former Soviet aircraft carriers Varyag, Minsk, and Kiev 
over the last decade brought much speculation about PLAN’s blue water goals.  It may 
have been only hype, after all no real progress in building an aircraft carrier has 
materialized.  In 1992, Chairman Deng Xiaoping gave the green light to start building an 
aircraft carrier by 1993.  There are complex issues and problems in building an 
indigenous aircraft carrier or upgrading Russian aircraft carriers, including technical, 
financial, and geopolitical problems according to Ian Storey and You Ji.45  For example, 
propulsion and electronics in the ex-Soviet carriers were stripped before being delivered.  
Also, China does not have any aircraft that can operate from these aircraft carriers due to 
the size limitation of current aircraft and no inventory of vertical short take-off and 
landing (VSTOL) aircraft, such as Harriers.  PLAN was rumored to have at least three 
 
40 LCACs are designed to quickly get limited troops and equipment on the beachheads. 
41  “Amphibious Operations: San Antonio Class LPD Crawls Forward,” Strategy Page, April 6, 2005, 
pp. 1-6. 
42 Baker, A.D., World Navies in Review, Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, March 1998. p. 3. 
43 LCACs aren’t designed to undertake a long, transoceanic voyage. 
44 Moore, F.D., “China’s Military Capabilities,” IDDS, June 2000, p. 6.   
45 Storey, Ian and Ji, You, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth From Rumors,” Naval 
War College Review, Winter 2004.   
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aircraft carriers in operation by 2005 (none of which have been built or commissioned 
yet).46  Some analysts believe that decrepit aircraft were purchased to use as models to 
study and reverse engineer or use as training platforms.  In any case, PLAN aircraft 
carrier development seems to be on hold at this moment. 
5. Why no Blue Water in PLAN? 
The PRC’s “blue water” goals have not been met so far, and remain elusive for a 
number of reasons.  First, despite economic growth, the PRC still lacks the financial 
resources and knowledge to modernize to that level.  Second, Beijing’s main focus 
remains the Taiwan issue.  Third, Soviet operational doctrine and tactics still persist, 
which hinders PLAN transition into blue water capability.47  Many scholars also 
subscribe to the belief that the PRC hopes to attain a blue water navy and enhance its 
power-projection capabilities. The most logical method of achieving this goal is 
described by Mohammed Ahari from Armed Forces Staff College, and includes an 
increase in logistic supply ships, nuclear-powered submarines with offensive platform, 
and state-of-the art command-and-control systems.48   
H. MIX AND MATCH 
The PLA’s modernization does have inherent weaknesses.  There are three main 
focuses to PLA modernization: acquisition or purchase of foreign arms, especially high-
tech weaponry; domestic improvement and innovation of technology and reverse 
engineering; and training and promoting professionalism. 
The purchase of modern weaponry from foreign markets has helped the PRC’s 
military capabilities to an extent, but it also created problems of integration.  The 
Japanese faced similar problems in the late 1800s, when ships and weapons of all types 
were purchased from Western nations.  The Japanese tried to find a theme and naval 
strategy using all different types of weapons.  China is facing a similar situation: trying to 
find the right mix of weapons for its national strategy.  Modernization of the air force and 
navy by purchasing different types of weapons from many different sources has resulted 
 
46 Smith, F.S., and Evans, D.J., “PRC Commitment to Aircraft Carrier Program Evidenced by Beijing 
Dealing with Turkey, Russia,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 6, 2001. 
47 Ji, You, The PLA’s Blue Water Illusion: Legacies, Models and Reality, CAPS Papers 32 (Taipei: 
Council of Advanced Policy Studies, December 2001). 
48 Aharari, M.E., “Strategic Implications of China’s Naval Modernization,” Armed Forces Staff 
College, October 1998. p. 9. 
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in upgrades of mix-and-match systems.  Many submarines and ships are being upgraded 
with commercial electronics and modified versions of old ships using newer technology 
as the foundation.  There is no integrated theme or identity in the PLA’s weapons 
inventory.   
I. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
The PLA’s effort to reverse engineer the high-tech weaponry has had limited 
success. The PLA’s aircraft engines and the naval ship propulsion systems are sub par 
compared with modern Russian and U.S. systems.  Most of PLAN’s modern ships and 
and aircraft still use General Electric or Rolls Royce engines.  There have been 
significant problems building nuclear-powered submarines.  The SSBN “Xia” class 
submarine failed test launches, and not much effort is carried out to modernize the 
strategic submarine fleet.  The newer Type 094 class was also delayed in its launch due to 
nuclear reactor problems as of December 2000.  In 2004, U.S. intelligence reported 
spotting a Type 094 on the coast of Bohai Bay, but Pentagon reports indicate that 
submarine will not be operational until 2010.49   The aircraft carriers that PLAN 
purchased from the Soviet Union have been turned into tourist attractions after a cost-
and-benefit analysis concluded the upgrade program was not viable.  
J. BUDGET 
The PLA budget has grown immensely due to the PRC’s economic success.  The 
public budget, most analysts agree, is a fraction of the true figure.50  The absolute size of 
the overall budget has increased substantially, but as a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP), it has not changed much.  The “official” 2004 budget of $30 billion USD 
jumped significantly over 2003 (by 20 percent).51  In order for the PLA to modernize and 
update its armed forces, there must be an increase in military expenditure as compared to 
GDP, which has not happened.  At this rate, the PLA may able to modernize slowly, but 
it will have a difficult time producing a blue-water navy within the next two decades. 
K. ISRAEL CONNECTION 
 
49 GlobalSecurity.org, “Weapons of Mass Destruction, Type 94.” From 
Hhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/type_94.htmH [Last accessed June 16, 2005] 
50 Shambaugh, David, Modernizing China’s Military (University of California Press, 2004) pp. 210-
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51 “European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy,” CRS 
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The PRC faces limited options when it comes to acquiring high-tech weapons.  
Israel remains the second-most important source of advanced military technology for the 
PRC.52  Total estimates of Israel’s military exports to the PRC are around $162 million 
USD from 1993 to 2002.53  The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 angered many 
Western nations, which began a boycott of arms sales to China, including by the United 
States.  Even though the PRC and Israel have established a warming relationship since 
1990, Israel is still susceptible to Washington’s influence.  For example, pressure from 
Washington on Tel Aviv caused cancellation of some sales, such as the Phalanx cruise 
missile defense for ships.54  Many European Union (EU) countries want to end the arms 
embargo, including France and Britain.  However, pressure by United States has kept the 
lid on arms sales for the moment.    
L. PLAN VS. NEIGHBORS 
The Southeast Asian countries’ naval forces are comparatively weak versus the 
modernizing PLAN fleet.  For instance, the Philippine Navy has less than a half dozen 
antiquated U.S. frigates and a dozen corvettes to patrol its 7,100 islands and 36,000 
kilometers of coastline.55  Furthermore, none of the major combat ships are equipped 
with anti-ship missiles or possess any antisubmarine technology.  The closest support it 
may receive is from the U.S. 7th Fleet out of Japan.  However, the transit time for U.S. 
naval forces to reach the South China Sea can take as long as four days.  Small islands 
such as the Spratlys can easily be overwhelmed by the PLAN in less time than it takes for 
help to reach them.  Currently PLAN does not appear to have this power-projection 
capability, but current modernization of its fleet for a possible Taiwan invasion may 




52 See Figure 1. 
53 Fisher, D. R., “The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of China’s 
People’s Liberation Army,” Center for Security Policy, January 2004. 
54 "PRC Statement Warns 'Other Countries' Not To Meddle in Israel Arms Trade," Hong Kong AFP in 
English, January 3, 2003. 
55 AllRefer Reference & Encyclopedia Resource, “Philippine Navy.” From 
Hhttp://reference.allrefer.comH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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M. CONCLUSION 
The People’s Liberation Army (especially PLAN) has undergone extensive 
modernization based on Chinese threat assessment and China’s economic progress. 
However, it is not likely to possess the capability to contest the U.S. Navy in the Persian 
Gulf by 2025.  
Modernizing the PLA into a high-tech army presents a great challenge since the 
PRC still lacks capabilities and often needs foreign assistance to do so.   The PLAN’s 
current inventory and its modernization clearly demonstrate a desire for regional 
dominance in Asia, especially in the places relevant to China’s economic growth, but its 
goals seem to be limited.  Domestic capabilities for shipbuilding and technology have 
increased with the help of weapons acquisition and technology transfer from countries 
like Russia and Israel.  However, political pressure by the United States can substantially 
hinder high-technology sales to the PRC.   
The PLA faces many challenges in technology and training that can transform its 
massive military into a modern military.  Beijing’s goal of becoming a regional power 
that can defeat less-able countries in the disputed territories and regions seems to be the 
main focus at this point.  A combatant match-up of PLAN against the United States Navy 








 PRC ARMS IMPORTS, 1993-2002* 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Totals %
Russia 772 79 376 945 430 111 1334 1642 2948 2185 10822 92
Ukraine 55 22   73 73 73 73 78 73 113 633 6 
Israel 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18   162 1 
France 5 19 14 21 15 7 18 7 7 9 122 1 
Italy   5 11 5 3   11   3   38 0 
USA 1           31       32 0 
UK           16 10       26 0 
                          
Year 
Totals 
851 143 419 1062 539 225 1495 1745 3049 2307 11835   
* $ millions; Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 26, 2003 












                                                
IV. DISTANCE DICTATES PRIORITIES 
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) future strategic interests and focus will 
depend on the capabilities of its navy and the distance it’s able to operate its navy in the 
sea from its shores.  The priorities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are 
likely to be directly proportional to the distance it has to travel by sea.  This may seem 
trivial or simplistic since the influence of the country’s military might (PLAN in this 
case) is only credible where it can effectively operate a military campaign.   
Currently, the PRC doesn’t have a substantial naval influence – or the like. The 
country does not have a “blue water navy,” but it has arguably transformed its “brown 
water navy” into a “green water navy” since the formation of the PRC in 1949.56   The 
PRC’s naval power is constrained by its limited logistical and power-projection 
capabilities far from its shores. Evidence supporting this is a 1980s statement made by 
Admiral Liu Huaqing, former commander of PLAN and vice chairman of the Central 
Military Council CMC.  He stressed the strategic importance of the “first island chain” 
and “second island chain.”57  The PLAN strategic priorities still appear to be dictated by 
this distinction, given that it has not accomplished its goal of controlling seas near its 
littoral waters, with Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), being a prime 
example.  Furthermore, Liu emphasized that the Chinese Navy should exert effective 
 
56 A navy that can operate sustained operations far from its littoral waters and have power projection 
capabilities.  Aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and underway replenishment ships may be part 
of the equation for possessing a “blue water navy”. “Brown water navy” refers to a navy only capable of 
operating close to its coast, while “green water navy” refers to naval operational coverage in a country’s 
littoral waters and beyond but with limited power projection beyond.   
57 McDevitt, Michael, "Ruminations About How Little We Know About the PLA Navy,” October 10, 
2000. From Hwww.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/CMA_Conf_Oct00/paper14.htmH [Last accessed June 11, 
2005]  
The First Island Chain of the Kuriles, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia delineates the first 
of these.  It includes the Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western East China Sea (ECS), including 
Taiwan; and the South China Sea. This line demarcates an area of China's vital national interests: territorial 
claims, natural resources, and coastal defense.  Liu hoped to have a PLA Navy in hand by the year 2000 
that would be capable of asserting Chinese control, if required, of this maritime area.   
The Second Island Chain extends the stage one line to run from Japan through the Bonins and Palau, 
and then to Indonesia, to include all of the ECS.  The target date for achieving PLAN “control” or at least 
“denial” of this area was nominally by 2020.  
The third stage of Liu’s maritime strategy, which was really more of a building plan, was aimed at the 
rest of the Pacific Ocean.  The "strategic goal" was a PLAN that could act as a global force, or at least a 
pan-Pacific force, by 2050.  
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maritime control on the “first island chain” as its primary goal.58  If Admiral Liu’s 
strategy of multiple tiers of goals holds true, then the precedence can subsequently be 
deduced to the following order:   
• Taiwan and South China Sea contested territories 
• Regions currently beyond PLAN’s operational capabilities  
This chapter will illustrate PLAN’s maritime strategy as primarily focused on the 
Taiwan Strait and South China Sea for the near future.  Although the Persian Gulf and 
Middle East are important to the PRC’s economy, PRC has prioritized its objectives into 
realistic goals based on unfinished business like national reunification, resources, and 
political influence. It is the contention of this thesis that the Persian Gulf will have to take 
a back seat (after 2025) until the primary goals of national reunification, control of its 
littoral waters and strategic sea lanes of communications in the South China Sea, and a 
blue water navy has been developed by the PRC.   
A. UNSOLVED PROBLEM 
Reunification of Taiwan with China appears to be the primary concern for the 
PRC.  The Taiwan issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but it should be noted that 
PRC’s maritime strategy in the Persian Gulf is a distant goal after the Taiwan issue.   
The PRC and the ROC have been at odds with each other since the communist 
victory led by Mao Zedong over the Kuomintang forces led by Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949. 
Chaing Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan to create a separate government.  Currently, the military 
match-up appears to be heavily in favor of the PRC in terms of numbers.  The PLA is the 
world’s largest army with 1.7 million men, versus the ROC’s 200 thousand (overall 
numerical ground force advantage is 7:1 in the PRC’s favor).59  The PLA also has an 
overwhelming numerical advantage in its number of tanks and aircraft. The countries are, 
however, separated by 130 miles of water (see Appendix D).60  
PLAN currently lacks the amphibious lift capabilities to place the ground troops 
to take Taiwan by force.  One can assume that the PRC will continue to modernize its  
58 Zalamea, Ulysses O, “Eagles and Dragons at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision Between the 
United States and China,” NWC Review, Autumn 1996. 
59 Marshall, Richard, “China-Taiwan Dispute Primer,” Virtual Information Center. p. 5. 
60 See Appendix D. From Hwww.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/GOV90ia/taiwanstrait.jpgH [Last 
accessed June 11, 2005] 
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amphibious capabilities, as well as its submarine force, to protect its warships and 
transports involving conflict with Taiwan.  Despite the PLAN’s lack of overt capabilities, 
the PRC intimidated the ROC with naval exercises in 2004 prior to the Taiwanese 
presidential election.61  PLAN will continue to play an important role militarily, and 
politically, with respect to the ROC.  
B. CONTROL OF SOUTH CHINA SEA AND CONTESTED TERRITORIES  
1. Strategies and Resources  
The South China Sea has abundant resources, including untapped oil reserves and 
valuable fishing grounds, so the PRC may see it as being of strategic and economic 
interest. This places this region as the PRC’s second most important maritime interest 
(see Appendix E).62  There have been many incidents of hostilities in the South China 
Sea involving the PRC in the last two decades (see Appendix G).63  The world’s fish 
supplies have been in rapid decline due to over fishing and decimation of some rich 
fishing grounds, and Chinese fishermen are increasingly exploring areas that are farther 
away from their homelands in open seas.  In March 2001, the Philippine navy forced 10 
Chinese vessels to leave Scarborough Shoal (a rocky outcrop in the South China Sea).64  
There are a number of more serious clashes for fishing rights, including the deaths of 70 
sailors and the sinking of several Vietnamese ships on Johnson Reef in the disputed 
Spratly Islands.   
The problem exists due to ambiguous and sometimes unclear laws governing the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ).  The United Nations Law of the Sea dictates in Articles 
55-75 that a country is entitled to control of an area up to 200 nautical miles beyond and 
adjacent to its territorial sea.65  Tensions occur with countries that have overlapping 
EEZs.  Chinese fishermen, and naval ships have occasionally breached territorial waters 
of its  neighbors,  steaming  within  12  nautical   miles of  the  shore, as  demonstrated in  
 
61 “China Drill Before Taiwan Poll,” BBC News, March 16, 2004. 
62 See Appendix E.  From Hwww.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
63 See Appendix G. After Hwww.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
64 Smith, Charles R., “Chinese Spy Ships Breach Japanese and Philippine Waters,” April 9, 2001. 
From Hhttp://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/4/8/195441.shtmlH [Last accessed June 16, 2005] 
65 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs, South China Sea Region,” 
September 2003. p. 3. From Hwww.eia.doe.govH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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September 2000 in Japanese and Philippine territorial waters.  The PRC will likely hold 
onto the claims of these islands, as economic resources such as food and oil will be 
necessary to sustain their domestic and economic needs. 
2. The Straits of Malacca  
The Straits of Malacca is an important chokepoint66 (see Appendix H) where vast 
amounts of shipping pass each year, totaling three times more shipping than the Suez 
Canal and five times more than the Panama Canal.67  Eleven million barrels per day of oil 
went through this narrow strait headed for China, Japan, Korea, and other Pacific 
nations.68  According to a report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the 
Straits of Malacca is likely to grow in strategic importance in coming years as more than 
50,000 vessels per year transit the region and oil exports are increasing from the Middle 
East to China.69    
3. The Spratly Islands 
The oil reserves in Southeast Asia may be fiercely contested in the near future, 
and the Spratly Islands may reveal hidden treasures that its claimants are hoping to seize.  
The Spratly Islands, consisting of more than 100 islands and reefs, which are about 5 
square kilometers in size, had been largely ignored by their many claimants prior to the 
1950s.  
The Spratlys’ natural resources will grow in importance as countries that have 
traditionally been net exporters of oil are increasingly becoming importers as demand 
rises and supplies shrink. Furthermore, countries that have been net exporters of oil are 
becoming net importers of oil, as demand for oil is increasing while accessible supplies 
of oil are getting smaller.    Also, instability in the Middle East is likely to further choke 
off dwindling oil supplies.  Recent discoveries have suggested that there could be as 
many as 225 billion barrels of oil and 2,000 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas in 
 
66 See Figure 4. 
67 Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” August 1999. From 
Hwww.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/choke.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
68 Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” April 7, 2004. From 
Hwww.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.pdfH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
69 Ibid. 
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the South China Sea and the shoals of the Spratly Islands.70  This means the islands’ 
claimants will not likely give up their goals of possessing the rich resources that lie 
underneath the Spratlys and the rest of the South China Sea. 
Currently the PRC controls seven of the Spratly Islands and reefs, and it seized 
the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974 (see Appendix F).71    The most notable 
recent hostility took place between the PRC and the Philippines at Mischief Reef. The 
naval clashes resulted in the sinking of ships and deaths of dozens of sailors.72  
The PRC and the other claimants of the Spratly Islands seek two major goals:  
first, to control oil and natural gas reserves near the Spratly Islands; second, to control the 
shipping lanes near these islands.  The vast amount of oil and natural gas has immense 
value to the Chinese economy and its rise to regional power in Asia.  Currently, the 
Spratly Islands are claimed by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam.73  With the exception of Vietnam, the United States maintains high trade 
volume with all those countries.  Two of the largest trading partners of the United States, 
Japan and Korea, heavily depend on oil that is transported through the Straits of Malacca 
near the Spratlys.  The PRC’s strategic goals in the South China Sea therefore play a 
prominent role as PLAN works to increase its naval capability. 
C. PRC BUILDING UP STRATEGIC SEA LANES 
The PRC’s focus on strategic sea lanes is evident.  China is intent on building 
stepping stones from China that stretch into the Persian Gulf.  The activities surrounding 
the region indicate a Chinese strategic focus on protecting its ability to access oil from 
the Persian Gulf, as well as enhancing the country’s ability to project influence 




70 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs, South China Sea Region,” 
September 2003. From Hwww.eia.doe.govH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
71 See Appendix F. From Hwww.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
72 Magno, Alex, “Naval Power Play Sets Off Alarms,” Timeasia, September 27, 1999, Vol. 154, No. 
12. 
73 See Figure 1. From Hwww.eia.doe.gov/cabs/schinatab.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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China ... is looking not only to build a blue-water navy to control the sea 
lanes, but also to develop undersea mines and missile capabilities to deter 
the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, 
including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with 
Taiwan.74  
Highlights of this regional expansion are as follows: 75 
1. Pakistan   
A Chinese naval base is under construction and may include electronic 
eavesdropping posts to monitor ship traffic through the Straits of Hormuz and the 
Arabian Sea.  
2. Bangladesh 
China is strengthening political ties with the Bangladeshi government, hoping for 
future commercial and naval cooperation, and it is planning to build a container port 
facility at Chittagong. 
3. Burma 
Beijing has close ties with the military regime in Myanmar, which is close to the 
Straits of Malacca, an important strategic choke point through which 80 percent of 
China's imported oil passes. Electronic intelligence-gathering facilities are being built on 
islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Straits of Malacca. Beijing has also supplied 
heavy military assistance to Rangoon.  
4. Cambodia 
A military agreement was signed in November 2003 to provide equipment and 
training. Beijing is also helping Cambodia to build a railway line from southern China to 
the sea. 
5. South China Sea 
Beijing appears to place greater importance on protecting transit lanes for tankers 
through the South China Sea than on past territorial claims.  
China is also building up military links to the mainland and Hainan Island for the 
purposes of projecting air and naval power.  An airstrip on Woody Island has been 
upgraded and supplemented by oil drilling platforms and ocean survey ships. 
 
74 “China builds up strategic sea lanes,” Washington Times, Jan, 23, 2005. From 
Hwww.infowars.comH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
75 Ibid., pp.1-3. 
33 
                                                
6. Thailand 
Construction of a “Kra Canal” has been proposed with help from the PRC, 
including $20 billion in aid to Thailand.  The canal across the Kra Isthmus would enable 
ships to bypass the Straits of Malacca. Port facilities, warehouses and other infrastructure 
would be controlled by the PRC.  
The report noted that the vast amount of oil shipped through the sea lanes, along 
with growing piracy and maritime terrorism, prompted China, as well as India, to build 
up naval power at chokepoints along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South 
China Sea.76 
D. CONCLUSION 
The PRC’s main goal for the next couple of decades points to reunification of 
Taiwan and control of the South China Sea.  Taiwan is the major political and military 
thorn for the PRC dating back to 1949.  The communist leadership in China has displayed 
a willingness to use all means possible, including intimidation and force, to reunite 
China.  Although the PLA is overwhelmingly larger in size, it does not now possess the 
naval capability to take Taiwan by force.  Therefore, it may be expected that PLAN will 
attempt to acquire many more amphibious and cargo ships in the future if it desires to 
reunite with Taiwan by force. 
The South China Sea also seems to be an important concern for the PRC, aside 
from reunification with Taiwan.  There have been many naval clashes between the PRC 
and its neighbors in the South China Sea since the 1970s.  The Spratly Islands and Straits 
of Malacca will play a major role for PLAN because of their strategic and economic 
implications for the PRC due to its heavy reliance on the shipping and trade routes.  
Current PLAN capabilities will limit its power to China’s green water for at least the next 
two decades.  
Accomplishing the PRC’s primary goals will not be easy due to resilient and 
persistent political pressure from Washington and the credible naval power of the U.S.’s 
Seventh Fleet, as well as Taiwan’s navy.  Control of the South China Sea by PLAN will 
 
76 “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, January 23, 2005. From 
Hwww.infowars.comH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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be very difficult since the region has so many implications for the international 
community.  The Spratly Islands will likely be on standby until a credible PLAN fleet is 
developed.  The buildup of strategic access points toward the Persian Gulf may be what 
Beijing has planned, but it will only happen if other countries sit back and let it happen.  
Even then, given PLAN naval capabilities, Beijing will have a difficult time 
accomplishing this goal by 2025.  The dragon will be on a “short leash” close to its own 


















                                                
V. SILK ROAD 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may rely on Iran as a key ally in the 
Middle East to strengthen its foothold and to offset the U.S. position as the main policing 
agency of the region.  President Jiang Zemin stated in 1994 that China should oppose 
"hegemony" by helping dissident countries like Iran, but he emphasized international 
stability and furthering China's development as more important.77  
There are several obvious reasons why Iran and China have formed an alliance.  
First, Washington and Teheran have had an antagonistic relationship since the overthrow 
of the Shah and the taking of U.S. hostages in 1979. These events led non-Western 
countries like China to take advantage of the diplomatic opportunity with Iran.  Second, 
the PRC does not want U.S. hegemony unchecked in the Middle East, where it may 
disrupt China’s oil needs.  The United States has a robust military presence in the Middle 
East, with more than 150,000 troops in Iraq alone in 2005, as well as a strong naval 
presence.78  Assuming that Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait will continue to 
allow an American military presence in their countries, Iran will remain the country 
likely to countenance a PRC naval presence.79   Third, Iran and the PRC have mutually 
beneficial relations in terms of their economies and defense affairs.  Fourth, and finally, 
the United States still maintains strong influence in the Middle East compared with 
China.   
The main argument in this chapter is to assess how Iran and China will continue 
to build strong political and economic ties in pursuit of their strategic goals and interests 
that will benefit  each other without provoking severe backlash by  the world community.   
 
77 Rynhold, Jonathan and Lee, Deng-Ker, “Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post Cold War Era," 
Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 8, August 1994. p. 85. 
78 United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in Manama, Bahrain controls the naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf with ships rotating from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet, comprising one or more 
Aircraft Carrier Group (CVBG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), surface ships, submarines, and various 
naval assets.  U.S. military has bases in Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other gulf states.   
79 See Appendix I, “Map of Persian Gulf.” From 
Hwww.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/arab_pennisula.gifH  [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
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This chapter underlines the PRC’s interest in sustaining Iran as an ally to gain entry into 
the Persian Gulf.   Beijing will use economic, security, and strategic measures to court 
Teheran and use its influence to stifle U.S. hegemony in the region. 
A. REGIONS BEYOND PLAN’S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Beijing considered both Iran and Iraq to be of strategic and economic importance 
to China, but since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., the only close ally remaining in the 
Persian Gulf is Iran.  The oil ventures that China obtained from Baghdad disappeared 
virtually overnight, leaving only Iran as the major future oil source and buyer of its arms.   
Relations with Teheran are especially valuable to China, given the expected growth of 
Chinese energy demands as well as the expected increases in the market price of oil. 
1. Background 
There is a huge disparity between Iran and the PRC in terms of economic success. 
The PRC is recognized worldwide as the next economic giant.  Iran, on the other hand, 
suffered dramatic economic decline and world prestige after the Ayatollah Khomeini 
overthrew Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979.  Iran has been isolated by the West, 
largely led by United States, in retaliation for seizing its assets and taking hostages during 
the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and Pentagon, President George W. Bush named Iran as one of the 
states sponsoring terrorism in his “Axis of Evil” speech.  Iran and China have 
experienced vastly contrasting economic growth in recent decades.  
Despite the differences between Beijing’s and Teheran’s political and economic 
development, they have found a mutual interest in developing strong ties and 
cooperation.  These interests determine each country’s priorities in foreign policy and 
dictate whether or not taking the risk to further develop their relationship is worth the 
trouble. 
The diplomatic ties between Iran and the PRC have been a relatively recent 
development, and have had a rocky start.  Initially, the governments of the People’s 
Republic of China and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1922, and Iran was the 
first country in western Asia to recognize the post-dynastic government in China.  
However, volatility between the two nations increased in 1951 as Iran sided with the US 
when a majority in the United Nations condemned the PRC as an “aggressor” nation for 
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its part in the Korean War.  Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (along the lines of 
containment policy toward the USSR), and Beijing saw this as one more move in the 
U.S.-led policy of encirclement to contain the communist bloc.  
Iran-PRC relations slowly improved with the collapse of the Sino-Soviet 
relationship in the 1960s.  Beijing was isolated from both superpowers and desperately 
needed international backing.  In 1971, Iran abstained from voting on the resolution to 
admit the PRC to the United Nations — the first time it had not voted against admitting 
the PRC — and in August of that year, the two countries established formal diplomatic 
relations.  
Sino-Iranian relations continued to be strong as late as 1978.  In September 1978, 
Mao Zedong's successor, Hua Guofeng, led a high-ranking delegation to Teheran, the last 
visit by a head of state to Teheran before the collapse of the Shah's rule.80  In January 
1980 — a time of warming relations between the United States and China — China 
abstained in the United Nations Security Council vote to sanction Iran for the hostage 
taking.  Currently, China and Iran have close diplomatic, economic, strategic, and 
security ties that bind them despite pressure from the United States. 
2. Yuan Renminibi and Rials 
Iran has strong financial interests in promoting continued economic development 
with China due to its continued economic isolation from the United States and its lack of 
exports other than oil.  Teheran’s treasury has been depleted since the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979.  The war between Iraq and Iran has cost the Iranians billions of dollars in 
military spending during the 1980s, and low oil prices, until most recently, launched Iran 
on a desperate search for cash.  
The heavy reliance on petroleum exports amounting to 80 percent of its total 
exports has made Iran’s treasury vulnerable to world oil prices.  Iran’s inefficient, state-
controlled economy, along with its isolation from the West, has created high 
unemployment rates and a deteriorating infrastructure in Iran.  The current domestic 
concerns over high unemployment and inflation may be a big problem for the current 
government under Mohammad Khatami, despite moderate reforms to liberalize Iran.  
 
80 Gill, Bates, “Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,” Middle East Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, May 1998. 
Recently, high oil prices have eased the financial situation of Teheran.  However, future 
oil prices will dictate the stability of the ruling party, and will ultimately influence the 
opinion of Iranians as they decide whether to call for a moderate government. 
The PRC has an interest in keeping Iran’s economy from cooling too rapidly and 
its growth rate at a moderate level.  The PRC doesn’t want Iran to become too 
economically successful so it doesn’t need China, yet it doesn’t want the country to fall 
apart, so China essentially becomes its sole support.  Unlike Iran, China has achieved 
superior economic prosperity.  For example, the PRC’s manufacturing exports rose about 
15 percent annually from the 1990s to 2000, where they were at $220 billion.  The PRC’s 
economy cooled in the late 1990s, affected by the Asian financial crisis, and growth was 
moderated to about 8 percent growth recently (see Figure 3).81  China’s membership in 
the World Trade Organization in 2001 has elevated its trade status and aided in the 
growth of its middle class.  Even with this moderation in recent times, the Chinese 
economy has become a powerhouse in the world.  China recently became the 5th largest 
economy in the world.    
 
Figure 3.   GDP Growth Rates from 1977-2002 (China, U.S, and Japan)  
 
 
                                                 
81 See Figure 1, “GDP Growth Rates.” From 
Hwww.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2003/swe0305a.htmlH Source: International Monetary Fund 
“International Financial Statistics” [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
38 
China’s biggest exports come from light industries, consumables, and 
manufacturing, all of which depend heavily on oil for manufacturing and transporting the 
goods.  Oil consumption in developing countries is expected to rise by 3 percent annually 
until 2025, with one-third of the demand coming from China (see Figure 4).82  China will 
increase its consumption from 5.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2003 to 12.8 million 
bbl/d by 2025.  In 2003, China overtook Japan as the world’s No. 2 consumer of oil, 










                                                
Figure 4.   China’s Oil Consumption and Production 
 
Trade volume between Iran and China has increased dramatically since 1975.  In 
1975, Iran-China trade before the Islamic Revolution was insignificant, amounting to 
$3.4 million.  The volume of Iran-China trade in 1998 is reported to have reached $1.215 
billion, an increase of 17.7 percent compared with 1997.  The respective annual figures 
amounted to $1.347 billion, $2.486 billion and $3.312 billion between 1999 and 2001.84   
Although not big compared to Japan and the United States, this indicates that the two 
countries are developing steady economic ties and growth. 
 
82 See Figure 4, “China’s Oil Consumption and Production.” From 
Hhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.htmlH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
83 Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief, China,” July 2004. From  
Hhttp://www.eia.doe.govH [Last accessed June 11, 2005] 
84 Rubin, Barry, “China’s Middle East Strategy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, March 1999.  
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There are currently multiple business ventures between China and Iran involving 
petroleum.  For instance, Teheran and Beijing initiated a $200 billion venture to develop 
and process liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Iran, with technical and financial help coming 
from China.  The deal calls for 10 million tons of Iranian LNG for the next 25 years.85  
The PRC will also manufacture a variety of ships to transport goods and oil to Iran.  
Recently, Iranian tanker company Mohammad Souri sought to acquire 87 LNG-carrying 
vessels by 2010 from China’s shipping industry.  Iranian and Chinese business amounts 
to hundreds of billions of dollars in the oil-related sector alone, not counting arms deals 
and other goods.  
Constructing a “pan-Asian continental hydrocarbon bridge” from the Caspian Sea 
through China as well as Japan and Korea is one of Beijing’s strategic goals.86  This is a 
joint project between Russia and China designed to supply 20 million to 30 million tons 
of oil to China each year.  The oil pipeline would involve several countries in the Middle 
East and Central Asia, including Iran, to conduct intercontinental terrain transportation of 
oil from the Middle East (Iran) and Central Asia to the Far East.  Under the terms of the 
contract, China will acquire the right to develop two oilfields (Aktuibinsk and Uzen) in 
exchange for its commitment to build a 3,000-kilometer pipeline from the oilfields to the 
Chinese region of Xinjiang, and a 250-kilometer pipeline to the border of Iran via 
Turkmenistan.87  The benefits of this joint venture are lower development costs and 
ultimately a cheaper way to import oil into China.  
Beijing wants this built for both economic and strategic reasons, as the pipeline 
will literally open another major oil artery other than the Straits of Malacca. If this land 
conduit is successfully constructed, China will have significant political and economic 
edges in influencing major importers of oil east of the Malacca Straits, including 
influence over Japan and Korea.  Almost half the oil tankers going thought the straits now 
end up in the Far East.    
 
 
85 Afrasiabi, Kaveh, “China Rocks the Geopolitical Boat,” ATIMES, November 28, 2004. 
86 Blagov, Sergei, “Russia, China Eye on Pan-Asian Bridge,” Asia Times, June 26, 2002. 
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Of course, investing in Iran’s petroleum industry is not without great risk.  The 
US’s Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizes foreign companies that invest more than 
$20 million in the countries’ oil industries.88  Beijing faces a dilemma when approaching 
Teheran with such a venture.  China needs future oil exports from Iran to sustain its 
domestic needs, but in doing so, it faces economic punishment from the United States for 
its actions.  Beijing sees relations with Washington as a priority now since trade sanctions 
would cool China’s economy.  
This may not hold true in the future, however.  Currently, China’s oil imports 
comprise about 25 percent of consumption.  This figure will likely double its current 
proportion by 2025.  It is unlikely that Beijing will give in to Washington due to 
overwhelming domestic pressures. 
3. Security 
Iran and China share a common interest in keeping the United States’ hegemonic 
influence from dominating the Gulf states. In June 2000, President Muhammad Khatami 
and his delegation visited China and spoke out against a “unipolar world” backed by 
global hegemony (referring to the United States).89  One way to balance this problem is 
for Beijing to provide arms to Iran. Arms sales serve two purposes for Beijing:  First, 
both countries share an interest in keeping the United States from becoming too strong in 
the region.  Beijing views its arms sales to Iran as a critical element of its regional 
security.  Second, commercial arms sales give China an opportunity to substantially 
decrease its costs of importing energy from the Middle East.  Furthermore, these arms 
sales, including elements of sophisticated nuclear and other "dual-use" technology, give 
China an opportunity to gain a foothold in the region and build up a long-term strategic 
link to secure its growing energy interests.  Arms sales from China to Iran have so far 
included an array of different weapons and technology, including conventional, nuclear, 
chemical and biological arms. 
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Prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, China sold arms to both Iran 
and Iraq for large profits and concessions-for-oil deals.  The PRC provided thousands of 
tanks, trucks, armored personnel vehicles, artillery pieces, surface-to-air missiles, air-to-
air missiles, more than a hundred fighter aircraft, and dozens of small warships.  These 
types of arms gave the United States and the West reason for big concern since Iran was 
regarded as a rogue state that sponsored terrorism.  
Aside from nuclear technology, the most worrisome weapons Iran has acquired 
from China are antiship cruise missiles.  Iran purchased Chinese cruise missiles like the 
HY-2 “Silkworm,” C801, and C802 missiles.90  These weapons can be used to destabilize 
the Persian Gulf.  The effectiveness of “Silkworm” missiles with 500-kilogram warheads 
is devastating to any ship.  During the Iran-Iraq war, several oil tankers were hit by these 
deadly weapons. This weapon can not only be targeted at oil tankers, but Iran routinely 
targets U.S. naval forces in the area.  A single disabled ship (commercial or military) in 
the Straits of Hormuz can virtually choke off the biggest artery for fuel, with devastating 
consequences worldwide.  
Iran’s nuclear technology is a major concern for United States. There have been 
several instances where China attempted to transfer nuclear technology to Iran.  For 
example, in 1991 it was reported that China and Iran had struck a deal under which China 
would sell a research reactor (20-30 megawatts) to Iran to be located at the Isfahan site.91 
It was canceled in 1992.  U.S. experts believe the reactor would have been able to 
produce up to 6 kilograms of plutonium per year. 
Another attempt was made in February 1993, when China and Iran signed an 
agreement under which the PRC would provide Teheran with an HT-6B Tokamak 
nuclear reactor to be located at Azad University in Teheran.92 In 1994, Chinese technical 
teams made two trips to Teheran to install, test, and fine-tune the reactor. In February 
1995, Iran informed Beijing that the reactor had successfully produced a 20-millisecond 
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92 "Transfer of Nuclear Device to Iran Cited," FBIS-CHI-95-078, April 21, 1995 (Zhongguo Tongxun 
She (Hong Kong), April 21, 1995). 
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electromagnetic discharge.93  This is significant, since a similar situation took place 
between the USSR and the PRC in the 1950s in which a research reactor was transferred, 
and the PRC developed its own nuclear weapons just a few years later.  
The transfer of high technology and nuclear-related programs has been under the 
United States’ microscope, and some Chinese companies have been sanctioned or 
boycotted.  For example, in May 2003, North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO) 
was barred all exports to U.S. government agencies for allegedly supplying missile 
technology to Iran.  This was a big loss for China, considering that NORINCO exported 
$100 million in products to the United States.94  There were more sanctions in July 2003 
and April 2004 against Chinese companies involved in these types of contracts with Iran.  
Washington has shown there is little room for tolerance when nuclear and missile 
technologies are sold to Iran.  
The PRC has used diplomacy and propaganda to provide taboo technology to Iran 
to strengthen its strategic foothold, while trying to avoid condemnation by the world 
community.  PRC Ambassador Zhang Yan addressed the Iranian nuclear issue in August 
2004.95  In his official comments, he praised Teheran for taking steps to comply with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines.  Ambassador Yan also spoke 
about the legitimate right for countries like Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful means.  
This suggests that the PRC’s foreign policy is likely to stay mainstream on nuclear issues 
while leaving room to provide nuclear technology and assistance to Iran. 
Teheran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology from Beijing seems logical, given 
that the country is virtually surrounded by nuclear weapons among its neighbors, 
including Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan.  However, Beijing must be very 
careful in this juggling act since it faces backlash and sanctions from the West, on which 
China heavily relies for exports.  This could be especially true for relations with the 
United States.  If Beijing continues to upset Washington over the Iranian nuclear issue, 
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the country could face political and economic setbacks that would inevitably upset its 
economy and domestic needs.  For example, high-tech and aviation technology in 
demand by China could be threatened.  China does not want another case of U.S. 
intervention in the Middle East region.  The PRC witnessed U.S. willingness to intervene 
militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Beijing wants stability while weakening the position 
of the United States in the Middle East.   
4. Strategies 
Beijing needs Teheran’s cooperation for its own strategic interests.  In 1970, there 
were no private vehicles in China.  Today there are ten million private vehicles in China, 
and of those, two million are in Beijing.  Conservative estimates project there will be 120 
million private vehicles by 2025.96  This number would represent ownership by less than 
ten percent of China’s population.  The number of vehicles would be staggering if China 
were to emulate auto-to-population ratios in the United States.  Current technology and 
limited alternatives to fossil fuel give China little choice but to import oil.  Furthering the 
PRC’s need for oil imports is the country’s situation with its own reserves. Current 
known reserves in Xinjiang suffer from geographic and technical challenges to extract 
them.  Offshore drilling is expensive, costing around $9-$23 per barrel.  At the 1999 price 
of $40 per barrel, the cost of extraction was too high level, according to some oil 
experts.97      
The best strategy to secure oil for China is to secure allies in the Middle East and 
Central Asia.  Expanding China’s global network of oil trade and oil development bases 
both geographically and politically will help excessive reliance on one source — 
allowing China to avoid putting all its eggs in the same basket.  The pipeline China is 
trying to build is another way the country is trying to meet its increasing oil needs. This 
would allow for better oil access from both Iran and Central Asia. If the pipelines are 
successfully built, all countries involved can enjoy their benefits.  
 
 
96 Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert, “China’s Thirst for Oil Gets Top Gear,” BBC News, October 1, 2004. 
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China and Iran use official meetings to promote and advance their foreign policy 
goals.  There have been many meetings and discussions working toward developing 
Iranian oil industries.  In one meeting, Energy Minister of Iran Zanganeh underlined 
opportunities for greater cooperation between the two countries, expressing hope that 
Teheran and Beijing can strengthen their mutual cooperation in oil, gas and 
petrochemical fields.98  Iran and China signed a memorandum of understanding awarding 
the project to develop Yadavaran oil field to China’s Sinopec.  Also, the NIOC has 
agreed to sell as much as 150,000 barrels per day of crude oil to China over a period of 
25 years once Yadavaran is in full swing.99    
China’s prospects for acquiring stable relations with both the United States and 
Iran are very good.  As the world becomes more globalized in the future, the United 
States may not possess the same great influence on trade it now holds. Currently, the 
United States can prevent goods from being traded with China with minor consequence.  
However, as the Chinese economy evolves and becomes intertwined with U.S. industry, 
Washington will not able to use sanctions and other economic hammers to punish China.  
For now, China has to walk a fine line in order not to throw off its relationship with 
Washington.   
B. ISRAEL AND XIANJING 
There are two additional major variables that may negatively effect the PRC’s 
foreign relations in the Middle East.  First, Beijing’s ties with Israel may lead other 
Middle Eastern countries to distrust the PRC.  Historically, the PRC publicly supported 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization and officially recognized the government.  
However, diplomatic relations shifted to warming ties with Israel after the Madrid 
Conference in 1991.  There have been numerous transactions between Beijing and Tel 
Aviv involving weapons and technology.  Also, the PRC was reminded of the limits on 
its ties to Israel when the sale of the Phalanx missile system to the PRC was canceled due 
to pressure from Washington in 2000.100   
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Second is China’s treatment of its Muslim population. The PRC’s Xinjiang region 
has been plagued for many years by Muslim independence movements, and Beijing has 
cracked down harshly with open executions and political imprisonment of many Muslim 
minorities under a slogan of “the war on terror.”  China has the highest reported rate of 
execution, with 1,067 executed in 1998,101 many of whom undoubtedly were in Xinjiang.  
Ruthless oppression of Muslim minorities will be a thorn between the PRC and the 
Middle East in the years to come.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Teheran holds the key to the PRC’s pursuit of its strategic and economic interests 
in the Middle East.  Although the PRC has no antagonistic relations and enjoys good 
terms with most Middle East nations, it is constrained by American political and military 
influence in the region.  Beijing needs Teheran’s blessings and cooperation to achieve its 
future domestic goals.  It has an interest in economic, security, and strategic ties to keep 
Teheran close.  Oil will be the biggest interest, along with growing trade (including 
arms), to play an important role in determining future policy.  At the same time, Beijing 
must avoid a backlash from the West — particularly the United States.  Beijing values 
Washington’s blessing because it has a tremendous market in the United States it cannot 
afford to lose.  The overall approach of the PRC’s relationship and policy toward Iran 
will improve as China improves its position in world trade.  Aside from a few challenging 
issues, such as Israel and Xinjiang, Beijing will certainly utilize Teheran as a “silk road” 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States seek stability in the 
Middle East, which is mutually beneficial. A war in the region could restrict the flow of 
oil, which in turn could affect the world economy, thereby hurting both the United States 
and the People’s Republic of China.  The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) 
naval modernization is impressive, but it faces many difficult challenges ahead.  The 
United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain is acting as a stabilizing force in the Persian 
Gulf, allowing safe transit of ships and freedom of navigation.  The PLAN will not have 
the capabilities or desire to contend with the United States Navy in this arena by 2025.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The PLA’s strategic shift has come as the threat of invasion near China’s border 
has been minimized.  Once a large and antiquated defensive-natured land military, the 
PLA is now trying to transform itself into a technically sophisticated, forward-looking 
military that includes a strong naval force.    
A successful Japanese naval modernization in the late 19th century proves that 
China, too, could quickly modernize and possess a blue water navy.  Evidence suggests, 
however, that PLAN’s modernization has been much less successful, and it will not have 
a navy capable of challenging the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf by 2025.  The 
modernization of the PLA is complicated by a heavy reliance on foreign imports and the 
lack of China’s own industrial base for modern weaponry.  Instead, the PLAN will focus 
its attention close to China’s shores — namely Taiwan and the South China Sea, where it 
has the capability to successfully challenge weaker neighbors. 
Iran will be the key to China’s entry into the Persian Gulf.  The United States 
dominates the Middle East and the Persian Gulf politically and militarily, with the only 
exception being Iran.  China and Iran have formed a relationship that counters the U.S. 
hegemony in the region.  Despite U.S. displeasure, China will continue to provide arms to 
Iran in exchange for oil.   
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There are repercussions for Beijing’s forming strong relations with Teheran.  
First, nuclear proliferation in Iran is seen as a destabilizing factor in the Middle East by 
most of the world, which may weaken China’s political influence and prestige.  Israel, 
from which China imports arms, may be reluctant to provide high-tech weapons that 
could end up in Iran via China.  Relations with Israel and the mistreatment of China’s 
Muslim population are debilitating factors in the Sino-Arab relationship. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The U.S. and Chinese demands for oil from the Persian Gulf may become a 
source of cooperation between the two nations.  Both countries desire readily accessible 
oil at low prices.  Instability in the Middle East — especially near the Persian Gulf — 
will surely drive up oil prices and curtail oil supplies.  High oil prices will not only hurt 
the Chinese and American economies, but affect economies worldwide.  
According to China expert Dr. Bernard Cole, control of China’s adjacent seas out 
to the first island chain (green water) is reasonable and attainable within the next 20 
years, with the caveats that Beijing change its national prioritization of resources and the 
United States and Japan allow it to occur.102  This evidence that suggests no blue water 
navy in the next two decades, in addition to the economic strife that would follow from 
instability in the Persian Gulf, suggests that the PLAN will not likely contest the United 
States Navy in the Persian Gulf by 2025.  Nevertheless, China would use force against 
the United States if it believes the benefits would outweigh the consequences. 
China is not afraid of using military force to resolve matters that involve 
territorial issues, as it has demonstrated against the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam in 
the 1960s through the 1970s when border issues arose.  There also have been dozens of 
clashes involving the PLAN and its neighbors in the South China Sea.   
The past has taught us China’s reaction to such military aggravation.  For 
example, during the Korean War, Washington underestimated Beijing’s willingness and 
capabilities  to attack  U.S. and U.N.  troops despite  the possibility  of retaliatory  nuclear  
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attacks.  Knowing this, accurate communication will prove key to avoiding a U.S.-China 
clash. Miscommunication must be avoided in the future, as lessons learned from the past 
show.   
The United States and China have had differences which could have proved 
catastrophic. The following issues have caused mistrust between the two nations, and yet 
they have managed to avoid crisis:  the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Taiwan 
Strait missile crisis in 1995-1996, and the Chinese Embassy (Belgrade) bombing in 1999.  
While these incidents did not provoke military responses on the part of the United States, 
they will inevitably play a role in future relations.    
Beijing has also displayed an increasing willingness to confront the United States. 
with its military at times.  In 2001, a PLAN Jianghu III class frigate aimed its gun fire-
control radar at a U.S. surveillance ship in international waters in the Yellow Sea, and it 
closed within 100 yards.  A week later, an overly-aggressive Chinese F-8 fighter jet 
collided with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft, which led to an emergency landing in 
Hainan Island.  Twenty-four U.S. crew members were detained for a short time by 
China.103  Luckily, these volatile events were successfully brought under control with 
careful diplomacy and dialogue.         
Despite the challenges, China and the United States can grow as competitors but 
do not have to embark on a collision course, according to Professor David Lampton.  He 
recommends the following policies for Beijing and Washington:  First, Washington 
should allow room for China’s growth (with G-8 as a starting point).  Second, Beijing 
must reassure others countries that its use of power will be respectful of their interests.104  
Lampton’s recommendations are sound.  Despite misgivings about China’s growing 
influence in world politics that may indicate a loss in Washington’s influence, there is no 
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The potential economic impact China could have on world trade is monumental, 
and increasing geopolitical influence will follow.  Washington may not be thrilled about 
Beijing’s growing influence in the Middle East, but it will need to think about taking a 
greater role in Beijing’s spheres of influence.  Iran will continue to be a hurdle for 
Washington.  Iran will use China as the counterbalance against the United States.  Other 
Gulf states that have friendly relations with Washington will likely form a closer 
relationship with Beijing as China’s economic and political prestige blossom.  The PLA 
and its supporting branches have made great progress — creating pockets of excellence 
— but they are still decades behind the U.S. military.  The United States must keep pace 
with its modernization and transformation in order to keep ahead of China.   The degree 
of influence that China has in the Persian Gulf, and limiting the PRC’s sphere, will be 
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APPENDIX B. PRC’S DOMESTIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
• Co-production of Su-27 fighters in China 
• Airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft 
• Luyang class destroyers 
• Type-054 frigates 
• Song class diesel-electric submarines 
• Yuan class diesel electric submarines 
• Type-093 nuclear powered attack submarines 
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APPENDIX C. ACQUISITIONS AND NEW WEAPONS 
PURCHASES FROM RUSSIA SINCE 1990 
 
• 402 Russian Su-27 & Su-30fighters 
• 12 Russian Kilo class diesel-electric submarine 
• 4 Russian Sovremenny class destroyers 
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APPENDIX F. SOUTH CHINA SEA TABLES AND MAPS - 
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE SPRATLY AND PARACEL 
ISLANDS  
Country Claim 
Brunei Does not occupy any of the islands but claims part of the South China Sea nearest to 
it as part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The boundary 
lines are drawn perpendicularly from two outermost points on the Brunei coastline. 
In 1984, Brunei declared an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef. 
China Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands and claims all of the islands and 
most of the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by 
coordinates or otherwise clearly defined. China also claims the Paracel Islands 
(referred to as the Xisha Islands) and includes them as part of its Hainan Island 
province.  
Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval 
expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming 
Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked the 
region over time, and China is using archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of 
sovereignty.   
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel 
islands. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, 
China produced a map with nine undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the 
islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region.  
China has occupied eight of those islands to enforce its claims. In 1974, China seized 
the Paracel Islands from Vietnam.  
Indonesia Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese 
claims in the South China Sea may extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental 
shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna gas field. 
Malaysia Its Spratly claims are based upon the continental shelf principle and have clearly 
defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied three islands that it considers to be 
within its continental shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil 
from the mainland and has built a hotel. 
Philippines Its Spratly claims have clearly defined coordinates, based both upon the proximity 
principle as well as on the explorations of a Philippine explorer in 1956. In 1971, the 
Philippines officially claimed eight islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on 
the basis of this exploration, arguing that the islands: 1) were not part of the Spratly 
Islands and 2) had not belonged to anyone and were open to being claimed. In 1972, 
they were designated as part of Palawan Province and have been occupied.  
62 
Taiwan Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China and are based upon the same principles. 
As with China, Taiwan's claims are also not clearly defined. Taiwan occupies Pratas 
Island in the Spratlys. 
Vietnam Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam 
claims the entire Spratly Islands (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) as an offshore district of 
the province of Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the 
South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined. In addition, Vietnam claims 
the Paracel Islands (the Hoang Sa in Vietnamese), although they were seized by the 
Chinese in 1974.  
The Vietnamese have followed the Chinese example of using archaeological 
evidence to bolster sovereignty claims. In the 1930s, France claimed the Spratly and 
Paracel islands on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam. Vietnam has since occupied 20 
of the Spratly Islands to enforce its claims.  
EEZ = Exclusive Economic Zone  
* The South China Sea is defined by the International Hydrographic Bureau as 
the body of water stretching in a southwest to northeast direction, the southern border of 
which is 3 degrees South latitude between South Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata 
Straits), and the northern border of which is the Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of 









APPENDIX G. MILITARY CLASHES IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA FROM 1974 TO 1999  
Date Countries  Military Action 
1974 China vs.  
Vietnam 
Chinese seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, with 18 of its troops killed in  
clashes on one of the islands. 
1988 China vs.  
Vietnam 
Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands. 
 Several Vietnamese boats were sunk and over 70 sailors killed. 
1992 China vs.  
Vietnam 
Vietnam accused China of landing troops on Da Luc Reef. China seized almost 20  
Vietnamese cargo ships transporting goods from Hong Kong from June - September. 
1994 China vs.  
Vietnam 
China and Vietnam had naval confrontations within Vietnam's internationally recognized 
territorial waters over Vietnam's Tu Chinh oil exploration blocks 133, 134, and 135. Chinese 
claim the area as part of their Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21) block.  
1995 China vs.  
Philippines 
China occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. Philippine military evicted the  
Chinese in March and destroyed Chinese markers. 
1995 Taiwan vs.  
Vietnam 
Taiwanese artillery fired on a Vietnamese supply ship. 
1996 China vs.  
Philippines 
In January, Chinese vessels engaged in a 90-minute gun battle with a Philippine navy  





The Philippine navy ordered a Chinese speedboat and two fishing boats to leave Scarborough 
Shoal in April; the Philippine navy later removed Chinese markers and raised its flag. China 
sent three warships to survey Philippine-occupied Panata and Kota Islands. 
1998 Philippines 
vs. Vietnam 
In January, Vietnamese soldiers fired on a Philippine fishing boat near Tennent (Pigeon) 
Reef. 
1999 China vs.  
Philippines 
In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a Philippine warship. In July, 
another Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a Philippine warship. 
1999 China vs.  
Philippines 
In May, Chinese warships were accused of harassing a Philippine navy vessel after it ran 
aground near the Spratly Islands. 
1999 Philippines 
vs. Vietnam 
In October, Vietnamese troops fired upon a Philippine air force plane on reconnaissance 
in the Spratly Islands. 
1999 Malaysia vs. 
Philippines  
In October, Philippine defense sources reported that two Malaysian fighter planes and 
two Philippine air force surveillance planes nearly engaged over a Malaysian-occupied 
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APPENDIX H. SUPERTANKER MOVEMENTS  
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